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Abstract 
The author shows that although some short term factors have contributed to the recent 
food crisis in developing countries, the crisis is rooted mainly in agricultural support 
policies of developed countries, liberalization of the agricultural sector by developing 
countries  and  contradictions  in  the  design  and  implementation  of  GATT/WTO  rules.  
Agricultural liberalization has been imposed on lower-income countries by International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) and through bilateral trade agreements between developed 
and developing countries. The Neo-liberal economic philosophies, as well as unequal 
power  relations  between  developing  and  developed  countries,  have  been  main 
contributory  factors.  There  is  a  danger  that  further  pressure  on  developing  countries 
during  the  Doha  Round  may  result  in  an  outcome  undermining  development  of  the 
agricultural sector of developing countries further. The result would be intensification of 
dependence of lower-income countries on food imports, knocked-down agriculture and 
economic  and  political  dependence  on  developed  countries.  A  radical  change  in  the 
trading  system,  practices  of  IFIs  and  policies  of  developed  countries  is  required. 
Developing countries have little power to bring about such changes, but they can try to 
change their  own policies.  To  do  so  it  is  not easy  to  resist pressure from  developed 
countries and IFIs, but it is absolutely necessary if they do not wish to sacrifice their 
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Introduction 
Since the middle of 2007, the world economy has faced three crises: financial, food and 
fuel. Seabrook (2008), a UK journalist, mentions correctly that food and financial crisis 
are sometimes attributed to wrong causes: food crisis to overpopulation in developing 
countries,  or  increased  demand  in  China  and  India;  financial  crisis  to  sub-prime 
borrowers. Similarly, fuel crisis is attributed to growth of demand in China and India.  
  The  food  crisis,  in  particular,  is  a  wake-up  call  for  developing  countries, 
especially  low-income  ones.  It  is  a  reminder  of  the  importance  of  agriculture  in  the 
economy  of  low-income  countries  which  rely  on  this sector  for  their  main source  of 
income  and  export  earnings.  Further,  foods  constitute  the  bulk  of  items  in  the 
consumption basket of the masses of population of these countries. Hence, it has direct 
and immediate effects on the life of the poor. The riot in nearly fifty countries, objecting 
to high food prices, in recent months is a telling evidence of the seriousness of the issue. 
Therefore, in this brief we will concentrate on the food crisis. 
  Many short-term and long-term (structural) factors, originating from both demand 
and supply, may have contributed to the recent food crisis ors. Often, little attention is, 
however,  paid  by  the  policy  makers  in  developed  countries  to  the  role  of  their  own 
agricultural policies and liberalization policies imposed on developing countries on the 
supply of food products in these countries.  As a result, the recent food Summit, held in 
early June 2008 in Rome, came up with some palliative measures, under the influence of 
developed countries, rather than curative ones. The delegation of Argentina together with 
delegates from a number of other Latin American countries correctly stated that “the   3 
Declaration  [of  the  Summit]  is  based  on  wrong  diagnosis  of  the  problem,  thus  the 
solution will not really address the root cause of the problem” (see SUNS, 7 June 2008).  
In our view two main factors have been the root causes of the food crises. One is 
the influence of the dominant market-based ideology of neo-liberals: These ideologies 
have been dictated by developed countries to developing countries through international 
financial institutions (IFIs), WTO, and their bilateral economic agreements of developed 
countries  with  these  countries.  The  other  one  is  agricultural  policies  of  developed 
countries in their own countries. Contrary to what they preached to developing countries, 
the governments of developed countries have been heavily supporting their food crops. 
Before proceeding further let us say a few words about the extent of the rise in food 
prices recently.   
Recent increase in food prices 
  The UNCTAD price index of main internationally traded food products increased, 
on average, by 84 per cent between May 2007 and end of April 2008; as compared with 
the 52 per cent increase between 2000 and end of Many 2007. Staple items, such as 
wheat and rice, show sharper price increases than indicated by the index of average food 
prices. For example, during May2007-Apri 2008 the price of wheat, rice and soybean and 
sugar increased by 91%, 216%, 101%, and 33%, respectively By contrast, the price of 
tropical beverages, which are not produced by developed countries and are not subject to 
protection  in  these  countries,  increased  only  by  28  per  cent  over  the  same  period 
(UNCTAD, Commodity Price Bulletin on line). 
Changes in the supply of food products   4 
  Drought during 2007-8 has been one cause of recent food shortages. Hence to 
exclude  this factor  let  us  consider changes in the supply of food in relation to GDP 
growth  in  developing  countries  during  2000-2006.  During  this  period,  GDP  growth 
accelerated, in relation to 1990-2000 period, noticeably in various groups of developing 
countries,  with  the  exception  of  Latin  America  (see  table  1).  Yet,  the  pace  of  food 
production decelerated, almost in all groups of developing countries, particularly in Sub-
Saharan  and  other  low-income  countries
1.  For  both  groups,  particularly  Sub-Saharan 
countries,  in  fact,  the  growth  in  food  production  fell  short  of  population  growth 
considerably (see table 1). The African continent as a whole has turned into significant 
net  importer  of  food  products.  In  1970,  ratio  of  (X-M)/X  of food (including  tropical 
products) for Africa was over 51% for tits total trade in food and 58% in its food trade 
with developed countries. The corresponding ratios were -50% and -86% in 2005 (table 
2). As exports include tropical beverages, the degree of import dependence on imports 
must be higher for staple food products.  
Apicultural policies; impact on production 
  No doubts many factors of short-term nature may have also contributed to the 
food crisis. However, agricultural policies of developed countries as well as developing 
countries  have  been  the  most  important  factors.  Under  the  pressure, 
                                                 
1  The growth rates are calculated for 1999/2001-2004/06 to avoid the effects of annual fluctuations.     1 
 
Table 1: Various indicators of growth of agricultural products and GDP (1990-2006)            Percentages 
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Low-income  3.3         3.1  3.23  2.34  3.08  1.01  2  5.38  4.7  6.5  3.38 
Middle-income  2  3.7  2.64  2.35  2.53  2.01  1.1  4.48  3.8  5.6  ? 
      Lower middle income  2.7  4  3.18  3.16  2.7  2.35  1.1  6.73  6.2  7.6  5.62 
      Upper middle income  0.8  3.3  1.74  0.17  0.2  0.82  0.9  2.73  2.2  3.9  1.83 
Lowe and middle income  2.4  3.6  2.85  2.35  2.69  1.72  1.5  4.58  3.9  5.7  3.08 
       East Asia & pacific  3.4  3.9  3.59  4.05  4.99  2.36  1.1  8.54  8.5  8.6  7.44 
       Europe and central Asia  -1.8  3.6  0.23  -1.28  -2.6  1.19  0.1  1.61  -0.9  5.8  1.51 
       Latin America & Caribbean  2.1  3.2  2.52  2.89  3.34  2  1.5  3.16  3.2  3.1  1.66 
       Middle East and North Africa  2.9  4.7  3.58  2.86  3.14  2.38  2  3.96  3.8  4.2  1.95 
       South Asia  3.3  2.7  1.22  2.29  3.17  0.69  1.8  6.06  5.5  7.0  4.26 
       Sub-Saharan Africa  3.3  3.5  3.4  2.19  2.86  1  2.6  3.33  2.5  4.7  0.73 
       China  4.1  4.2  4.14  4.92  5.8  3.33  0.9  10.3  10.6  9.8  9.4 
        India  3.2  2.7  3.01  2.32  3.11  0.92  1.7  6.46  5.9  7.4  4.76 
High income countries  1.4  0.5  1.06  0.77  1.22  0.9  0.7  2.55  2.7  2.3  1.85 
       Euro area  1.6  -0.4  0.85  0.31  0.62  0.36  0.4  1.88  2.1  1.5  1.48 
       USA  3.5  2.6  3.16  1.7  1.83  1.46  1.1  3.2  3.5  2.6  2.1 
                       
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2007 (World Bank, Washington D.C) 
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1970  1982  1995  2005 
Total Exports ($m.)  3498  8009  14273  21409 
Exports to developed countries ($m)  2815  5510  10362  13186 
Share of developed countries (%)  80.5  68.8  72.6  61.6 
Total imports ($m.)  1692  12209  18401  32158 
Imports from developed countries  1162  9228  11942  15211 
Share of developed countries (%)  68,4  71.5  64.9  47.3 
X-M : total  1806  -4200  -4128  -10749 
X-M: trade with developed countries  1653  -318  -9097  -11346 
(X-M)/X: total  51.6  -52.4  -28.9  -50.2 
(X-M)/X: trade with developed countries  58  -5.8  -87.8  -86.1 
 
Sources: Based on UNCTAD; Handbook of Statistics, various issues 
 
Low-income  countries  have  had  to  liberalize  production  and  trade  in  agricultural 
products, remove, or reduce, subsidies paid on input and /output of farm products and 
dismantle their marketing boards. These changes have exposed their food production to 
unfair competitive pressure in internal and international markets. International prices in 
these markets have been affected by agricultural subsidies and support measures provided 
to  food  production  and  exports  in  developed  countries.  EU  conducts  market  price 
intervention in 72%of its agricultural products. The US fixes minimum price for many 
agricultural products and intervene in the market when market prices fall below minimum 
price (Jhamtani, 2008).Developed countries spent nearly $400 billions a year on support 
for their agricultural products, which is equivalent of over $1760 per head of their rural 
population. And it is 55 times higher than total exports of agricultural products from the 
whole of the African continent.  
  The agricultural support programme of the US together with CAP of the EU has 
resulted in surplus in main food items in excess of their domestic consumption. Hence,   2 
they  had  to  create  a  food  export  market  for  themselves  in  developing  countries  by 
subsidizing their exports. As a result, many developing countries became dependent on 
imports of subsidized food items sacrificing their food security.  
A few examples of changes in food supply at the country level 
Let us refer to a few examples of such negative influences of agricultural policies on food 
production in developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Ghana was self-
sufficient in rice in 1970s.It started liberalizing its agricultural sector in early 1980s. By 
2002, imports constituted 64% of domestic supply of rice increasing to 79 % in 2003 
(Khor, 2008 and Bassey, 2008). The domestic rice output in the Northern region alone 
was 56000 tons in 1978-80; it fell to 27000 for the whole country in 1983. In 2003 import 
of American rice, the export price of which was 34% below its production cost, mounted 
to 111000 tons (Khor, Ibid). Total imports of rice increased to 250,000 tons in 1998 and 
415150 tons in 2003 (Bassey, 2008).  
  The increase in dependence of Ghana on imports is not confined to such staple 
items as food; other food items have been affected too. One example is tomato. EU’s 
processed tomato enjoyed $ 298 million direct aid, let alone its indirect support (Ibid: 2-
3). The privatized and liberalized tomato production of the country has faced imports of 
subsidized EU tomato paste since around mid 1990s. It imports increased from 3200 
tonnes in 1994 to 24077 tonnes in 2002.  
  EU’s Chicken exports to Ghana, and other West African countries, enjoyed Euro 
254 subsidies per ton and affected domestic supply in these countries. In the case of 
Ghana, imports made up 89 per cent of domestic supply of poultry in 2001, as compared 
with 5% in 1992. In Cameron, reduction of import tariffs to 25 per cent led to imports of   3 
poultry by about six folds. In Senegal, 70% of local production of poultry was wiped out 
(Bassey, 2008). In Cote d’avoire, domestic production of poultry dropped by 23 per cent 
between 2001 and 2003.  
  In Mozambique, local production of Vegetable oils dropped from 21000 tonnes in 
1981 to 3500 tonnes in 2002 (Ibid).  
  By contrast, when an African country ignored advice of the World Bank and IMF 
to liberalize agriculture, it did not face shortages. One example is Malawi (Ghosh, 2008).  
  In Asia, the example of Indonesian rice and soybean and Chinese soybean are 
interesting.  Indonesia was almost sufficient in rice until late 1990s. Beginning in 1967, 
the Government supported production of rice and stabilized its price through its trading 
operations, until the financial crisis of 1997. In this year, under the pressure from IMF, 
the Government began liberalization of rice imports and reduction of its intervention in 
the domestic market. In 1997, the price of imported rice was below the fixed purchase 
price  paid  by  the  Government.  By  2000,  the  rice  market  was  liberalized  almost 
completely, and the private sector distributed 90% of the national need supplied mainly 
by imported rice. The domination of the private sector also contributed to speculation in 
the domestic market for rice (Jhamtani, 2008).  
  The liberalization of the Soybean in Indonesia has also resulted in the reduction in 
the area under cultivation of this product from nearly 1.7 million hectares in 1992 to 
almost 457 thousands hectares in 2007. The price of subsidized imported US soybean 
was 22 per cent lower that its cost of domestic production in Indonesia (ibid3-4).  
  In  the  case  of  China  also  imports  of  Soybean,  mainly  from  subsidized  US 
products, has been responsible for reduction in domestic production. The country was an   4 
exporter of soybean up to 1990s and was self-sufficient until 2000 before it entered the 
WTO. The entry into this organization was accompanied by the reduction of the import 
duty  on  soybean  to  3  per  cent.  In  2006,  the  price  of  imported  soybean  was  below 
domestic cost of production in the northeast province of Heilongjiang even if labour cost 
was not included in the cost of production (ibid:3). As a result, imports of soybean have 
shot  up.  In  2007  imported  soybean  accounted  for  more  than  two-thirds  of  domestic 
consumption (Jianjun Wen (2008). Currently, China’s imports accounts for 40 per cent of 
world production of Soya beans (Ghosh 2008). 
  Ghosh (2008) and Jianjun Wen (2008) have shown that except for Soya bean, 
China has not been responsible for the increase in world demand for main food products 
as the domestic supply satisfies the increased demand of main staple food items (Jiajun 
Wen, 2008). In the case of grain, China in fact produced a surplus in 2007 (Jiajun Wen; 
ibid: 2). It is also interesting to note that that the difference between the performance of 
staple  food  items  and  Soybean  is  basically  due  to  the  trade  policies  of  the  Chinese 
Government. The Government liberalized trade in Soybean drastically, while continued 
providing support to the production of main staple food items. 
  In Latin America, the examples of Haiti, Mexico and Colombia are telling. Haiti 
was self-sufficient in rice till 1980s. Imports started to exceed domestic production by the 
1990s  due  to  trade  liberalization  imposed  by  the  IMF;  the  import  duty  on  rice  was 
decreased from 35% to 3%. As domestic production has declined drastically, currently 
the country imports 82% of its total consumption of rice (Carlsen: 2008:2). 
  In the case of Mexico, the fate of corn, inter alia, provides another example of the 
negative impact of government policies on production. But it is not the only one. NAFTA   5 
has eliminated  government controls on imports and  marketing of  corn. The domestic 
market is dominated by a few TNCs.  Local producers are not only subject to low import 
prices,  but  also  suffer  from  uncertainness  about  prices.  Instead  of  paying  domestic 
producers decent prices, TNCs threaten to undercut them by imports. Hence, while the 
Government pays a huge amount of subsidy and consumers pay for high prices for their 
purchase of the product, production of corn is discouraged. In one state (Sinalo), the 
Government paid nearly 37 million pesos for marketing to Cargil and Minsa (two large 
TNCs) in white corn harvest of 2005-6 (Carlsen).  
  A number of other staple food items, e.g. wheat, rice, and oilseeds and cattle 
rearing  have  had  the  same  fate.  Although  exports  of  some  agricultural  products 
(tomatoes, peppers, fruits and vegetables) have increased rapidly, the country has become 
dependent on imports of staple food items. In the process, small farmers (which account 
for 85% of Mexico’s farmers), have been hit hard by import competition. As a result, the 
outflow  of  farmers,  mainly  small  ones,  to  the  USA  is  estimated  to  have  been  about 
300.000 a  year during 2000-05.  It is also estimated that between 1992 and 2002 the 
number of agricultural holders fell by 75 per cent from 2.3 million to 575000 (Mohanty).  
  In Colombia, the concessional  wheat imports from the USA increased by 10 
times from 40.000 tones in early 1950s to almost 400.000 in 1971. During this period 
domestic production of wheat declined by about two-third. A number of other products 
also went out of production (Friedman, 2008).  
 
 
   6 
Contradictions in trade rules  
There are a number of contradictions in the neo-liberal economic philosophy, reflected on 
the  design  and  implementation  of  international  trade  rules  (GATT/WTO),  on  the 
conditionalities  imposed  on  developing  countries  by  IFIs  and  on  the  policies  and 
practices of developed countries. These contradictions are related to the role of market as 
well  as  government  policies
2.  Regarding  the  role  of  the  market,  while  neo-liberals 
recommend the absence of government interference in the market and in the flow of 
international trade, they disregard the increasing monopoly/oligopoly power of TNCs in 
international trade and production in general, including international trade and production 
of agricultural products.  
  Similarly,  the  preamble  to  GATT  (1947)  refers  to  the  objective  of  trade 
liberalization.  Yet the GATT/WTO rules are silent about the increasing market power of 
TNCs. Similarly while the World Bank and IMF have published volumes of studies on 
trade liberalization and competition policies and put pressures on developing countries to 
liberalize  trade,  they  hardly  discuss  the  inimical  power  of TNCs  in  the  market.  Five 
hundreds TNCs accounted for 70% of international trade in general. And a handful of 
companies  dominate  market  for  main  food  products.  They  include  e.g,  Cargil,  Mona 
Santo,  Minsa-Aranica,  International  Agroinsa,  maseca-Archer  Daniel  Midland.    If 
anything, the WTO rules facilitate the operation of the TNCs through the agreements on 
TRIPs, TRIMS and services (Wade, 2005). 
Speculative activities of TNCs 
Developing countries are advised by neo-liberals, and are put under pressure by IFIs, to 
liberalize their trade in agriculture, as well manufacturing products, uniformly. Yet the 
                                                 
2 See Shafaeddin (2005) for details.    7 
“market  forces”  are  allowed  to  operate  selectively  and  marginally.  TNCs  not  only 
dominate production, trade and processing of food products, but they also engage freely 
in  speculative  activities  in  international  as  well  as  domestic  markets  of  developing 
countries. In the international market, the crisis in the financial and hosing market has 
motivated  them  to  intensify  their  speculative  activities  in  the  commodity  market, 
including petroleum, gold and food products (Ghosh: 6; Crow:2 and Seabrook:2).  
  There are numerous examples of domination and speculative activities of TNCs in 
the  domestic  markets  of  developing  countries.  In  China,  as  the  government  withheld 
intervention in the market for soybeans, 4 TNCs controlled about 85 per cent of the 
market and they engaged in speculative activities which resulted in the surge in prices. 
For example, in 2005 the price of soybean increased by 60 per cent within two months 
(Jiajun Wen: 3). In Mexico speculation and hoarding by 4 TNCs which dominate the 
national  corn  market,  resulted  in  a  sharp  increase  in  domestic  price  of  corn  in  2006 
reaching over 100 per cent of their purchase price of domestic corn. The price increase 
far exceeded increases in the international price of corn despite the fact that enough stock 
of corn was available in the domestic market (Carlsen, 2008:3). By their dual operation in 
the corn market the Maseca and other TNCs have got control of small mills and tortilla 
producers. Hence, they increased the price of corn sold to mills and sold corn flour to 
tortilla producers at lower prices. By increasing the supply of processed tortilla “below 
the cost of production of traditionally made tortillas”, they undercut small processors 
((Carlson, 2008: op.cit.).  
  The design of GATT/WTO rules suffer from other contradictions as well. While 
the philosophy behind GATT/WTO rules is specialization based on the principle of static   8 
comparative  advantage,  agricultural  sector  (as  well  as  main  labour  intensive 
manufactured  goods)  has  been  excluded  from  GATT  right  from  the  beginning. 
Developed countries, justify support of their agricultural sector for social (income support 
for farmers) and strategic (food security) reasons. It is not clear why social considerations 
are relevant to farmers with income per head of $1.5 million, but not to farmers of low-
income countries with income of $1 a day (per capita income of 366). According to a 
new bill passed in the US congress a couple with annual farm income of $1.5 million also 
will receive subsidies (see below). Yet, they preach countries whose farmers live on $1 a 
day, to liberalize their agriculture. Similarly, it is not clear why food security is not to be 
important for poor countries.  
  Even at the time the liberalization of the agricultural sector was under negotiation 
in  WTO,  and  at  the  time  the  US  delegation  advocated  further  liberalization  of  the 
agricultural  sector  and  preached  “all  countries  to  allow  free  flow  of  food  and  safe 
technologies”! the Food Summit in Rome the US congress passed the 2008 Farm Bill, 
which became law, increasing  “trade distorting  support” on 17 out of 25 agricultural 
products. The new Law would cost the government $289 billion over a period of five 
years, out of which about $10 billion are hidden subsidies. Although the approved bill 
contains subsidies which are partly regarded non-distorting (Green Box subsidies), they 
have, in fact, trade distorting effects (SUNS, 19 May, 2008). Further, in defiance to the 
ruling by WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the bill includes, inter alia, a new 
cotton incentive programme similar to the previous scheme which was regarded illegal by 
DSB. In other words, the US Government does not intend to comply with the ruling of   9 
DSB (Ibid and SUNS, 5 June, 2008). The bill also provides subsidies to a couple with 
farm income of up to $1.5 million as mentioned before.  
  The US Government advocates free flow of safe technology in food production 
(read  Genetically  Modified  Seeds-GMOs).  Le  us  assume  that  GMOs  are  safe. 
Contradicting such a position, it allows control of GMOs by its TNCs (most of TNCs 
involved in GMOs are from the USA). GMOs are patent protected patent through TRIPs. 
Protection of new technology is regarded justified by the US delegation in his speech in 
the ECOSA meeting of June 2007. These contradictory words and deeds are not unusual 
by the US authorities.  
  EU  aims  at  self-sufficiency  in  main  staple  food  items  despite  high  cost  of 
production in the member countries. Yet the EU authorities put pressure on poor African, 
Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP), to liberalize their agriculture making them subject to 
cheap subsidized imported food from EU countries.  They are put under pressure to sign 
EPA, (Economic Partnership [sic] Agreement) providing concessions on reciprocal basis 
on the ground that farmers in ACP countries should play on “a leveled field”. Yet, the 
field is not leveled by any means and the players are not of equal skill and strength.  
Through EPA they try to impose conditions on ACP countries which are more stringent 
than those proposed at WTO during the Doha round negotiations on agriculture (Oxfam, 
2008: table 1).Oxfam correctly concludes that “the deal currently on the table will strip 
ACP countries of important policy tools they need to develop.”(Ibid: 1). 
  Further, Government of developed countries and their importing companies apply 
stringent SPS (sanitary and phytosanitary) measures to food imports from developing 
countries. Yet they export contaminated genetically modified food, through food aid or   10 
otherwise, to developing countries which do not have the capacity for quality control. 
Incidences of exports of such products have been noticed in Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Angola, Malawi, Zambia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Nigeria, Sudan and Sierra 
Leon.   In some cases African developing countries (e.g. Sudan and Angola), have been 
pushed  to  accept  genetically  modified  food  aid  against  their  will  (Bassey,  2008). 
Genetically modified foods are scientifically proved not only unsafe and unhealthy, but 
also uneconomic. In the USA there have been judiciary rulings against GMOs as they 
were regarded unsafe in a number of cases (HO, 2008 and 2007).   
  The  story  does  not  end  here.  Even  when  developing  countries  develop  the 
capacity to comply with stringent SPS measures, developed countries raise the issue of 
“carbon-mile” under the pretext of environmental protection. For example, the EU has 
been considering restriction of imports of vegetables and fruits from Africa, transported 
through air-cargo, to reduce air-pollution despite the fact that local production of these 
products out of season is more polluting. 
The dilemma of policy proposals 
It is not surprising that a report of “International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, 
Science and Technology for Development”, has concluded that: “…excessive and rapid 
trade liberalization can have negative consequences for food security, poverty alleviation 
and the environment”. Further, it is added that “market forces alone cannot deliver food 
security  to  the  poor”  (Ching,  2008:2).    This  is  an  authoritative  report  sponsored  by 
various UN organizations and to which 400 eminent authors have contributed. It  has 
drawn on the  “evidence and assessment of thousands of experts worldwide”. (Ching, 
2008:1). But it is surprising that despite inputs by such a large number of experts, a few   11 
developed countries have not as yet approved the report. It is very likely that the USA 
Government  will  not  sign  to  it  at  all  as  the  US  delegate  claims  that  the  report  is 
“unbalanced”  objecting  to  its  conclusions  on  the  role  of  market  and,  in  particular, 
negative impacts of pre-mature trade liberalization in developing countries(Ibid:2).  
  Mr. Zoelic, the World Bank President, warns that the food crisis could push 100 
million people into deeper poverty. He, however, neither does admit the responsibility of 
the Bank in contributing to the problem, nor he refers to the lessons the bank can learn 
from the crisis for its Structural Adjustment programmes. In fact, despite the wake-up 
call of the food crisis, the policy proposals preached by neo-liberals and IFIs are for more 
liberalization of trade and agricultural production in developing countries. Sp are and 
government of developed countries while they continue heavy protection of their own 
agricultural sector.  
Concluding remarks 
We have argued in this brief that the food crisis in developing countries is rooted in the 
agricultural policies of developed countries as well as agricultural liberalization policies 
imposed on developing countries during the last quarter of century. The contribution of 
structural factors to food crisis is such that high prices of food will continue in the future 
unless there is a fundamental change in policies of developed countries, practices of IFIs 
regarding agricultural strategy of developing countries and related WTO rules. In fact, 
according to a joint report by OECD and FAO it is predicted that during the next decade, 
the price of food items would rise further by 20 per cent for beef and pork, 30 per cent for 
sugar, 40 to 60 per cent for wheat, maize and skimmed milk, over 60 per cent for oilseeds 
and more than 80 per cent for vegetable oils.    12 
  To remedy the food crisis, the UN Secretary General suggested, during the Food 
Summit held in  Rome in June 2008, to provide social safety net to the poor countries by 
“building the capacity of mall farmers to increase food production”.  While providing 
resources to poor farmers is necessary, their food production will not increase unless they 
are also provided with price incentive, agricultural support services and marketing board 
for  signalling  predictable  price.  The  provision  of  such  changes,  however,  requires 
changes in current agricultural policies and practices in both developing and developed 
countries.  These  changes  are  against  the  philosophy  of  neo-liberals,  “Washington 
Consensus”, practices of IFIs and governments of developed countries in their bilateral 
trade  agreements  with  developing  countries.  Without  such  changes,  however,  the 
agricultural  sector  of  low-income  countries  will  suffer  further.  The  knocked-down 
agriculture, added to de-industrialization of these countries would result in their further 
dependence  on  food  imports,  foreign  aid,  stagnation  and  intensification  of  poverty. 
Consensus  is  developing  in  developing  countries  that  “Washington  Consensus”  is  a 
recipe for backwardness, economic and political dependence. Knocked-down agriculture, 
after de-industrialization, in low-income countries is another wake-up call for developing 
countries to grasp the consequence of following advice from neo-liberals and neo-liberal 
institutions. Resisting such policies is not easy, but necessary for long-term development 
of their country and well being of their population. They should also resist the EU’s EPA, 
as it stands, as well as pressure in the Doha Round for an “imbalanced” outcome. The 
choice  is  between  further  economic  and  political  dependence  and  backwardness  and 
sacrifices of short-term gains- if any-resulting from the Doha Round if current proposals 
of developing countries are accepte. A radical change in the trading system, practices of   13 
IFIs  and policies of developed countries is required. Developing countries have little 
power to bring about such changes, but they can try to change their own policies. It is not 
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